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 RACE, RACISM, AND SOCIAL 
POLICY  
 Albert  Atkin 
 Policy-making must always pay attention to race. That is the central claim of this chapter. To put 
the claim a little more broadly, I suggest that regardless of whether some particular policy debate 
is ostensibly “racial”, policy-makers must attend to questions of race in their policy discussions. 
At a fi rst pass, it might seem that a philosophical essay on race, racism, and social policy would 
do well to focus on a particular set of topics where matters of race seem to be most pertinent to 
policy – issues such as affi rmative action, statistical profi ling, or reparations, for instance. Indeed, 
this is the most common strategy, but the strategy for discussing race and policy that I pursue in 
this chapter is different and is motivated by three starting points or presuppositions: fi rst, I main-
tain that philosophical and ethical refl ection on social policy ought to be directed towards practi-
cal outcomes and real-world impact; second, I maintain that, unlike many current philosophical 
approaches to race and social policy, we must pay more attention to the  social dimensions of race; 
and third, I argue that race is ubiquitous but frequently unnoticed, and as a result must be a 
relevant consideration for appropriately cautious policy-makers. I shall expand upon these three 
starting points in more detail ahead (in  Part 1 ), but crucially they lead back to my central claim 
that race should always be a matter of consideration for policy-makers, regardless of how remote 
racial concerns may seem to be from the policy in question. I shall then (in  Part 2 ) explain and 
support this central claim by introducing an example of the type of philosophical question about 
race that I think philosophers and policy-makers would do well to examine. In particular, I shall 
explore how the general racial question “What is race?” is pertinent to policy consideration. 
 Part 1: starting points 
 As I have stated, the central claim I am making in this chapter is that public policy-makers 
must pay close attention to race, and I shall highlight how they might do this by examining an 
example question that policy would do to well attend to in  Part 2 . In this part of the chapter, 
however, I shall introduce some important starting points that lead me to make this claim about 
race, philosophy, and policy. In particular, I raise three important issues or questions here: fi rst, 
how should philosophers be engaging and refl ecting on matters of policy-making? Second, how 
should philosophers be engaging with public policy as it intersects with matters of race? And 
fi nally, why think (as I do) that proper philosophical engagement in public policy must have a 
special onus upon it to attend to the impact of race and racism? We’ll look at each point in turn. 
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 The fi rst starting point for my concerns here, then, is with  how philosophers should be engaging 
with matters of public policy-making . My own philosophical inclinations are broadly pragmatic and 
pragmatist, and as such, I am sympathetic to the idea that where philosophy and philosophers 
engage with social policy, they should do so by looking to the practical and pragmatic con-
cerns of real policy-making rather than by becoming preoccupied with applying ethical theory 
to problems under laboratory conditions, so to speak. More specifi cally, I am most inclined 
towards an approach to philosophy and public policy found in Jonathan Wolff (2011), and 
Jonathan  Wolff and Avner de Shalitt (2007 ), which Wolff characterises as “bottom-up” theoris-
ing. In simple terms, bottom-up theorising demands that we approach social policy questions 
by understanding the real practical problems that give rise to those questions. This is in contrast 
to a “top-down” approach, where we might start from a prior understanding of ethical theory 
and ask what a consistent application of that theory requires of our policy-making. 
 Wolff has various reasons for favouring a bottom-up approach to philosophical engagement 
with social policy, but I favour his approach because of three particular requirements it asks 
of us. First, the bottom-up approach requires that we accommodate the fact that the practi-
cal requirements of those problems that drive policy debate will change across the history of 
a policy area. As Wolff (2011, 7), borrowing from Joel  Feinberg (1987 , 18), notes, practical 
concerns mean that we are often engaged with  penultimate questions and problems rather than 
with giving  fi nal and ultimate answers . In terms of race and racism, this will mean that our policy 
objectives are better framed and judged in terms of local and specifi c issues rather than with 
fi nal goals in mind. Australians from the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander community 
experience many poor social outcomes primarily due to the racist and racialised settler colonial-
ism of Australia, but the policies which affect these communities must focus primarily on, for 
instance, implementing clear interim targets for improving access to proper health care rather 
than focusing on larger-scale, more nebulous objectives, such as ‘eradicating racism’. These are, 
of course, important fi nal aims and ambitions for Australian society, but they are not the kind of 
objective by which to guide or judge interim policies in the face of appalling disparities in life 
expectancy, unacceptable child mortality rates, or troublingly high suicide and mental health 
problems among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups. 
 The second thing that a bottom-up approach to policy requires of us is, as already noted, that 
we focus on practice rather than theory. However, I take this practicalist dimension of bottom-
up theorising to be especially important in philosophical deliberation on policy and race, and to 
have a much broader impact than mere appeals to attend to practice fi rst. In particular, I take 
the practicalist requirement to mean that we must attend closely to real racial experiences, or 
rather, the experiences of the racialised, in our examination of policy. We can, for example, 
simply contrast a theory-fi rst approach to affi rmative action policy that looks at what our pre-
ferred ethical theories suggest about differential treatment with a practice-fi rst approach that 
looks to current practices of affi rmative action and intended outcomes. But I also take it that a 
practicalist approach means that we should pay especially close attention to the racialised experi-
ences of those for whom race-based affi rmative action policies are supposed to apply, and their 
experiences under the implementation of those policies. 
 Third, and fi nally, I take a bottom-up approach to require engagement with the fi ne detail 
of practical policy-making, and most importantly, familiarity with the context and history of 
particular policies. As Wolff puts it, 
 [S]ome policies may simply be a refl ection or hangover of value systems that are 
outmoded or should never have been accepted in the fi rst place. But history can 
matter. Existing policies may be cobbled together to respond to previous historical 
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circumstances, including policy failure, and being aware of the history of a policy area 
can help us become sensitive to possible pitfalls with new recommendations. 
 (Wolff 2011, 7) 
 In matters of race and public policy, this third element requires that we pay very close attention 
to the  racial history and context of particular policy-making. Now in certain cases – for instance, 
the bans on interracial marriage famously overturned in the 1967  Loving v. Virginia case ( Loving 
v. Virginia , 388 US 1. [1967]) -– the racial origin and context of particular policies are quite 
clear. In many other policy areas, however, the racial and racialised origin and context are less 
immediately apparent, and the importance for understanding the racial dimensions of current 
policy is frequently obscured. In  Part 2 of this chapter, I will examine instances where the racial 
history of certain policies becomes particularly relevant, but for now it’s enough to note that by 
adopting a bottom-up approach to philosophy and policy, we must always seek to understand 
the racial history of a policy area. 
 The second starting point for my concerns here is with how  philosophers should be engaging 
with public policy as it intersects with matters of race . Unfortunately, this leads me into some rather 
negative and curmudgeonly refl ection on current philosophical engagements with matters of 
policy and race. To be brief, proper engagement requires a much fuller understanding of the 
extensive social nature of race, racism, and the experiences of the racialised than we frequently 
see in philosophical engagement with race and policy. We shall return to this in discussion at 
various points in what follows ahead, but the concern is that race is ubiquitous and so inter-
twined with the nature and origin of the societies in which we live that we must attend to it 
by acknowledging and incorporating its social and structural nature, rather than by including it 
in our theorising as a thin and underspecifi ed place-holder for colour-based differential treat-
ment. In this respect, current philosophical refl ections on race and public policy are frequently 
underwhelming. Nonetheless, my hope is that by showing why we might be concerned with 
current approaches that do not do proper work with race, we can begin to see how proper 
engagement should proceed. 
 The complaint here, then, is that where the interaction between race and the philosophy 
of public policy fi nds itself confi ned to particular topics, such as affi rmative action, statistical 
profi ling, and reparations, it is frequently under-explored. There is, of course, no reason why 
a focus on particular topics and racial matters cannot lead to important, insightful, and valuable 
work on race. Indeed, well-worked-out and full-blooded refl ection on race exists in work on, 
for example, affi rmative action (see  Anderson 2010 ), or racial profi ling (see  Lever 2017 ). The 
problem, however, is that when focusing on specifi c debates with a racial dimension, race usu-
ally features as a rather ghostly and anaemic philosophical version of itself. To give some specifi c 
but common examples, race usually turns up in policy debates as either a “useful analogy”, a 
“place-holder variable” for any dimension of inequality, or a “fi lter on some intuition pump” 
or other. Consider the following illustrative cases. 
 In various arguments on same-sex marriage or on animal experimentation, for example, race 
and racism are used as  useful analogies . It is obvious, so the arguments go, that we shouldn’t and 
don’t insist on same-race marriage, and that the ethical reasoning here is transferable to debate 
on same-sex marriage (see, e.g.,  Wedgwood 1999 , 240, or  Rajczi 2008 ). Similarly, so the argu-
ment goes, the obvious immorality and impermissibility of racism are serviceable as an argument 
against animal experimentation and “speciesism” – ‘speciesism and racism are suffi ciently similar 
so that analogies between them cannot be blithely dismissed as category mistakes’ ( LaFollette 
and Shanks 1996 , 42). Whatever we might think about the analogical reasoning in these cases, 
and I think there are serious problems, the problem is that policy debate on marriage equality or 
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animal experimentation which uses race in this way pays too little regard to the deep structural 
dimensions of race, and the wide-ranging social impacts that accrue to racial difference. 
 Relatedly, race is often used as a  place-holder variable for any dimension of differential treat-
ment without paying full attention to what makes racial identity distinct. Discussion of statisti-
cal profi ling, for example, usually frames itself in terms of criminal  racial profi ling ( Risse and 
Zeckhauser 2004 or  Risse 2007 are good examples), but there isn’t often much sense that the 
positions that emerge from such philosophical refl ection here would not have been served just 
as well by using some other dimension of individual social identity, such as gender, sexuality, 
or disability. Indeed, as Annabelle Lever notes, 
 [T]his approach treats racial profi ling as one example among many others of a general 
problem in egalitarian political philosophy, occasioned by the fact that treating people 
as equals does not always require, or permit, us to treat them the same. 
 ( Lever 2017 , 425) 
 When properly understood, however, race presents a different and complicating set of consid-
erations that do not hold of, say, sexuality or disability, and it is important that we understand 
just how signifi cant the differences between race, gender, sexuality, and so forth are when it 
comes to examining race and policy. Indeed, Lever’s own work on racial profi ling is a good 
example of how we can take account of the deep structural elements of race – something Lever 
labels ‘the social construction approach’ ( Lever 2017 , 425) – when we engage with race and 
policy in specifi c areas of policy debate. 
 Finally, race is sometimes used as a  fi lter on an intuition pump . An especially good example of 
this can be found in philosophical discussion of immigration, and especially in Michael Walzer’s 
examination of how far nations are free to self-determine the make-up of their own popula-
tion ( 1983 , 42–48). For Walzer, racist and racial policies such as the White Australia policy (to 
which we shall return in  Part 2 ) are simply to be used as test cases for how robust our intuitions 
about the nation’s right to self-determine really are. The ethical and philosophical questions that 
arise from the racial elements of immigration are actually much deeper and far more socially 
complex than such a treatment can capture, and proper refl ection needs to examine the ethi-
cal dimensions of race and racism in immigration policy in a much more thorough way (see 
 Mendoza 2015 and  Mendoza 2018 ). 
 Obviously, there are other ways in which race features in philosophical work on policy, but 
these three – as a useful analogy, a place-holder variable, or a fi lter on some intuition pump – 
are quite common. Now, as previously suggested, the concern here is with how philosophers 
should engage with race and policy, and the worry expressed in these three example cases is that 
treating race in these thin, under-explored ways leads to fruitless engagement between policy 
and race. In particular, such engagement leaves us with philosophical refl ection on racial matters 
that fails to capture the impact and scale of race in a racialised society. Race must be handled in 
a much more complex and thoughtful way. Indeed, even in the discussion of these examples 
I mentioned work by Elizabeth Anderson, Annabelle Lever, and Jose Jorge Mendoza, which 
is among a growing body of philosophical engagement with questions of social policy that  does 
engage with race in a deeper and more fruitful way. 
 The third and fi nal starting point for my concerns here is with why we should think there 
is a special onus in philosophy and policy to engage with race. And in fact, the point here is 
the rather simple claim that race is a complex and ubiquitous social presence, but for large parts 
of society, almost completely unnoticed. It is helpful, I think, to divide this concern into two 
points: fi rst, that contemporary society is founded upon and functions through a set of racial 
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and racist structures and institutions; and second, that our society is geared to the normativity 
of whiteness. 
 To expand slightly, the reason these two points lead to the claim that race is ubiquitous 
but unnoticed is that, on the one hand, contemporary democratic societies are founded on a 
series of philosophical views which divide the world into racialised hierarchies. Charles Mills 
famously describes this in his book  The Racial Contract ( Mills 1997 ), and in later work notes the 
racism inherent the views of philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant: 
 Hobbes depictions of Native Americans as “savages” still in the (apparently real for 
them) state of nature; Locke’s investments in the slave-trading Royal Africa Com-
pany, his role in writing the Carolina Constitution, and his representation of Native 
Americans and incompetent appropriators; Rousseau’s limiting of contemporaneous 
savagery and his non-condemnation of African slavery; and (the easiest case) Kant’s 
racial hierarchy. 
 ( Mills 2017 , 69) 
 The racialised views of these fi gures (and others besides, including Hume, Hegel, John Stuart 
Mill, and Adam Smith) provide many of the philosophical foundations and justifi cations for 
organising contemporary society. Unsurprisingly, these racialised views fi nd themselves every-
where embedded within the tools and institutions of our societies. 
 In terms of the normativity of whiteness, on the other hand, whiteness is both privileged by 
the ease with which it can navigate the racialised social structures made by and for white people 
(see  Sullivan 2006 ), and made normative in virtue of treating race as something other groups 
in the hierarchy have as a result of failing to be white. This has the interesting effect of making 
white people largely unaware of the impact and presence of race at large, and seldom aware of 
their own race. As the black academic Patricia Williams notes, 
 You need two chairs at the table: one for you and one for your blackness. For white 
people, moreover, racial denial tends to engender a profoundly invested disingenu-
ousness, an innocence that amounts to the transgressive refusal to know. Again this is 
not to assign anything like blame, simply to observe the way in which we know race 
or don’t. 
 ( Williams 1997 , 27) 
 Between the overriding presence of racialised structures in society, and the normativity of 
whiteness, we can see the substance of the claim that race is ubiquitous, but largely unnoticed 
by large parts of society. In short, racial hierarchies are used to build and maintain society to the 
advantage of white people, but white people are invested in not seeing their own race, or its 
role in securing their position at the top of these hierarchies. Or to borrow a well-worn idiom, 
fi sh are the last to discover water. 
 The simultaneous ubiquity and invisibility (to the benefi ciaries of racial privilege) of race 
are relevant to my concerns here, though, because, as mentioned, I take it to introduce a par-
ticular onus upon those considering philosophy and policy to attend to race. More specifi cally, 
philosophy as an academic discipline is remarkably white. Similarly, those in the position to 
develop and infl uence policy-making are remarkably white. It would be unsurprising, then, 
if somewhere between the whiteness of philosophy and the whiteness of policy-making, the 
ever-present impact and infl uence of race go unnoticed. For philosophers interested in policy, 
this means that the risk of passing race by without noticing its infl uence gives us reason to think 
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some special provision must be made to ensure that race is not passed by, but instead properly 
attended to in policy deliberations. 
 These three starting points for considering race and public policy may seem fairly involved, 
but it should hopefully be clear why I take them to matter. Bottom-up theorising means get-
ting to grips with the fi ne detail of policy at the real interface between policy-making and the 
racialised experiences of those it impacts upon. The proper way for philosophers to engage 
with race in matters of policy is not by treating race as a thin, abstracted theoretical tool but 
by attending to the complex social conditions that have given life to it, and which maintain it. 
And fi nally, because of the ubiquity of race and the whiteness of philosophy and policy-making, 
responsible refl ection must ensure that race is not being missed, unnoticed, or merely given 
lip-service. This, I take it, is enough to at least give some sense of my claim that policy must 
always pay attention to race. 
 Part 2: race and policy 
 In the preceding section, I gave three starting points for my claim that philosophical engagement 
with social policy must always address race. In this part of the chapter I will try to give an extended 
example of the type of question about race that might very well play a role in guiding those 
engaging with race and policy. My particular concern will be with the importance of addressing 
the question ‘what is race?’. There are other questions which we might easily identify as being 
important here – ‘who defi nes racial membership?’, or ‘what are we using race for?’, for instance. 
Obviously, these are all fairly general racial questions for philosophers refl ecting on policy to 
engage with, and I certainly do not mean to suggest that asking general (non-policy-specifi c) 
questions about race is the only way to address the issue of race in policy. Indeed, throughout 
the preceding section I mentioned work by philosophers who are engaging with quite specifi c 
policy questions about race in what seems to me to be exactly the right spirit. Rather, what I am 
suggesting here is that regardless of whether we are not dealing directly with racial policy debates, 
such as race-based affi rmative action or criminal racial profi ling, there are important general racial 
questions that we must be aware of. The example used ahead – ‘what is race?’ – is, I think, the 
clearest example of why policy-makers must ask higher-level, more general questions about race. 
 What is race? 
 It is important that philosophers engaging with policy attend to the issue of what race is, and what 
type of conception of race they might be working with in policy deliberation. In many ways, 
this draws most directly upon the second starting point discussed in  Part 1 , where I suggested that 
race is a deep and complex socially constructed phenomenon, and that proper engagement with 
it in policy questions must attend to this dimension. Indeed, my complaint against much contem-
porary philosophical engagement with race and policy is that it frequently fails to do this. Here, 
though, I want to explore the relevance of raising this question by fi rst contrasting two dimen-
sions of our current understanding of race – the biological dimension, and the social dimension – 
before secondly, looking at some reasons why this difference matters to policy debate. 
 Biological race v. social race 
 Race is a curious and troublesome concept, and for all the reasons one might expect: it’s hard 
to say precisely what it is or what makes someone one race rather than another; it is the founda-
tion for some of the most unsavoury aspects of human behaviour and history, and so on. But it 
15031-2168d-1pass-r02.indd   286 9/10/2018   2:22:45 PM
Race, racism, and social policy
287
is made especially curious and troublesome because it has two elements, one  biological and the 
other  social . To be more precise, race is really a set of biological pretensions which ground a set 
of very real social constructions and constraints. This becomes troublesome in many discussions 
of race, however, because the biological pretensions and the social constraints frequently come 
apart, and the biological dimension tends to dominate our refl ections upon race. 
 Race, viewed in biological terms, is best understood through the question of whether race as 
we understand it and use it has any substantial corollary in the biological sciences. As it happens, 
it doesn’t, or at least this is what informed consensus suggests, but this doesn’t stop a certain 
level of philosophical engagement and discussion of race in biological terms, not least because 
race as a concept has pretensions to be a robust scientifi c fact. 
 The idea that race and racial difference are a matter of biological fact is due in part to the 
origin of the modern concept in the enlightenment science of  Linneaus (1758 ),  Blumenbach 
(1795 ), and  Kant (1775 ), among others. What we fi nd among these thinkers is an essentialising 
view of race whereby the external bodily markers of race – skin colour, hair type, nose shape, 
and so on – come to be explained in terms of some deep underlying biological difference con-
nected to breeding and ancestry. This construal of race in essentialist terms more or less gives 
us our modern concept, and even though we know that enlightenment scientifi c essentialism 
about race is empty, we still see contemporary questions about the underlying biology of race 
engaging racial difference in terms of genetic difference. Are races sub-species or, in much of 
the most recent debates about the biological reality of race, population clusters? General con-
sensus is that whatever the biological sciences might suggest about human groups and popula-
tions, there is nothing to support the idea that race as ordinarily understood is a robust biological 
category (see, e.g., Lewontin 1972,  Zack 2002 ,  Hochman 2013 , or  Atkin 2017 ). Importantly, 
though, debate about whether race tracks some real biological category or is largely specious 
tends to be a core component of much philosophical refl ection on race. 
 The other dimension to our contemporary view of race is that, partly because of the enlight-
enment’s construal of race as a biologically robust category, it has been used to construct and 
justify a set of social conditions and constraints according to the racial categories it creates. This 
has led to different treatment and expectations for different races within society as a result. 
Looking at race in social terms, we see that being an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander in 
Australia, for example, is a matter of being subject to a set of specifi c social conditions and 
expectations in virtue of the perceived physiological and biological markers used to delineate 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from other races in Australia. This is in contrast to the set 
of social conditions and expectations that white Australians are subject to in virtue of the per-
ceived markers of whiteness. This manifests itself in terms of different social outcomes whereby 
white Australians have much better experiences in education and so much higher rates of edu-
cational attainment; white Australians have much better access to health care in the Australian 
health care system and so have remarkably higher life expectancy rates; and so on. 
 The sociocultural and historical practices surrounding the use of race and racial difference 
are, in many ways, the more important and interesting element of examining what race is. The 
biological pretensions of race are really nothing more than a fl imsy justifi cation for the deep 
differential treatment that manifests itself in the social reality of race. For this reason, then, it is 
important that we attend to the differences between race and racial categories as they arise from 
its social, rather than biological, dimension. To give an example of how this difference affects 
our understanding, consider the case of swimming in the United States: 
 Black Americans are less likely to be able to swim than their white counterparts. Early (and 
specious) biological explanations of racial difference put this disparity down to underlying 
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physiological differences between the races. According to this claim, higher bone density, 
lower lung capacity, or even higher basal metabolic rate make black people less buoy-
ant and so less capable at swimming ( Allen and Nickel 1969 ). By taking account of the 
social dimensions of race in the United States, however, we see that black Americans are 
currently and historically more likely to live in areas where there is no proper access to 
swimming pools or functional swimming programs, and that even where there is access to 
usable pools and programs, black people have historically faced exclusion and discrimina-
tion in those venues. One upshot is that swimming is simply not part of black American 
culture ( Wiltse 2014 ); another is that black Americans die from accidental drowning in 
proportionally higher numbers ( Hastings et al. 2006 ). It should, I hope, be obvious, why 
policy-makers interested in doing something about higher rates of accidental drowning 
amongst black Americans would do well to avail themselves of the difference between 
the biological and social dimensions of race here. 
 Why does it matter to policy? 
 Turning to why policy-makers (and philosophers refl ecting on policy-making) need to pay 
close attention to the difference between the biological and social dimensions of race, the 
example of black swimming in the US ought, I think, to be instructive. It is clear, in such a 
case, that a focus on the biological dimension would likely lead to one type of policy response, 
while a focus on the social dimension would likely lead to another. Moreover, it ought to be 
clear that the social dimension is probably the most pressing in this case. However, as much 
of the complaint in  Part 1 suggests, there is a tendency among philosophers to focus on the 
thinner biological dimensions of race. The concern here, though, is with the claim that phi-
losophers and policy-makers would do well to attend to the question “What is race?” and to 
ensure that they are paying suffi cient attention to the social dimension of race and racialisation. 
I want, then, to conclude this section by looking at two reasons for thinking that attending to 
this question (what is race?) in this way (by focusing on its social dimensions) matters to policy. 
 The fi rst reason we should pay close attention to whether we are focusing on the biological 
or social dimensions of race is that too heavy a focus on biological questions and the biological 
pretensions of race has  a corrupting effect on policy-making . An especially good example of how a 
focus on the biological dimensions of race corrupts policy-making is given in a recent paper by 
Tina Fernandes Botts ( Botts 2017 ). Botts notes that there is a discernible shift in the Supreme 
Court of the United States’ understanding of race from a social to a biological phenomenon. 
This she argues leads to a change in the court’s understanding of when the Equal Protection 
clause applies, and a change in their general understanding of what counts as racial discrimina-
tion and to whom it applies. As Botts points out, 
 [A]s the US Supreme Court’s concept of race moves from being understood as a 
sociocultural/sociohistorical phenomenon to being understood as a purely biological 
phenomenon, there is a concomitant shift on the part of the Court from understand-
ing racial discrimination as problematic because it reinforces the legacy and vestiges of 
American chattel slavery, to understanding racial discrimination as problematic per se. 
 ( Botts 2017 , 526) 
 The effect of adopting this view of race as a putative biological category, she argues, is 
that Supreme Court decisions treat any attention to race or differential treatment of race as 
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unconstitutional; why should black people  or white people be excluded from some position 
or opportunity in society because of a biological fact over which they have no control? The 
knock-on effect on policy, however, is dramatic. Affi rmative action programs in the United 
States, for example, are increasingly abandoned on the grounds of upheld cases of racial dis-
crimination against excluded white applicants (e.g.,  Gratz v. Bollinger , 539 US 244 [2003]). 
Unfortunately, such reasoning by-passes the social dimension of race, where we can see quite 
clearly that racial discrimination is not simply any differential treatment on the basis of race, but 
should be properly understood as the product of America’s long-standing cultural and historical 
disposition to treat black people as (considerably) less than the equal of white people. 
 What Botts shows us in her discussion of equal protection law in the United States is just 
how problematic a narrow focus on the biological dimension of race can be for policy debate. 
On a biological view of race, racial discrimination in the US is any form of differential treat-
ment attributable to racial difference. On a social view of race, however, racial discrimination is 
differential treatment which compounds and reinvents the subjugation and oppression of black 
(and other non-white) Americans as part of the ongoing legacy of chattel slavery. Indeed, at 
a broader level, the corrupting effect of this focus on race as biological is shown in the over-
whelming American political tendency towards race-neutral policy-making ( Lieberman 2005 ), 
and tip-toeing around white discomfort with dissent towards white racial privilege. 
 The second reason why we should attend to the question “What is race?” and ensure we 
are accounting for its social dimensions is that viewing race in biological terms often  masks the 
role that apparently non-racial policy has played in the social construction of race . If we are to engage in 
bottom-up theorising about policy, to engage with race in its fullest and most socially robust 
sense, and to acknowledge the simultaneous ubiquity and hiddenness of race, we must be care-
ful not to let a biological conception of race keep us ignorant of the sometimes hidden racial 
dimensions of policy areas. By way of illustration, consider the example of immigration policy. 
 If we treat race as a merely biological matter, and we view immigration policy as a matter 
of nations exercising their rights to control borders and population, it’s not so straightforward 
to see how immigration policy is deeply racial. It’s true, of course, that much populist sen-
timent about immigration is driven by barely concealed racism, but policy-making seldom 
makes explicit appeal to racial difference in demarcating acceptable immigration. Nonetheless, 
there is almost always the feeling that the practical application of immigration policy has the 
undertone of racial vetting, which is unsurprising given the role that immigration policies have 
played in the social construction of national identities, racial hierarchies, and the prescription of 
acceptable racial categories. At this point, though, we are looking at race in social (rather than 
biological) terms, and at the role immigration policy has played in the making and maintaining 
of race as a social category. 
 To elaborate, both the United States and Australia have, in the past, enforced anti-Chinese 
immigration policies – the US’s  Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and Australia’s  Immigration Restric-
tion Act (1901). In such instances, policy-makers were clearly intent upon determining the racial 
make-up of their countries, and imposing whiteness as a normative standard of acceptabil-
ity. The political instigator of the Australian  Immigration Restriction Act (1901), Prime Minister 
Edmund Barton, argued explicitly in Parliament that ‘the doctrine of the equality of man was 
never intended to apply to the equality of the Englishman and the Chinaman’, and in refl ect-
ing on the “success” of the policy in 1903, Australia’s second prime minister, Alfred Deakin, 
stated that 
 The alien coloured population is being steadily reduced. [. . .] A white Australia does 
not, by any means mean only the preservation of the complexion of the people of this 
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country. It means the multiplying of their homes, so that we may be able to occupy, 
use and defend every part of our continent; it means the maintenance of conditions of 
life fi t for white men and white women; it means equal laws and opportunities for all. 
 (Quoted in  Cook 1999 , 179) 
 Viewing race socially, then, makes the racial nature of immigration policy clear. It is, and has long 
been, a tool for the construction and maintaining of racial hierarchies, and for the privileging of 
whiteness. Such refl ection should, in turn, change the nature and impetus behind our philosophi-
cal engagement with immigration policy-making. We can no longer raise questions about immi-
gration policy and freedom of association or governmental right to self-determination as though 
such matters are simply race-neutral. We should, instead, try to acknowledge and accommodate 
the racial nature of ethical questions about immigration in our public policy deliberation. 
 To give one illustration of how this might matter, once the social dimension of race in immi-
gration is made clearer we can see how the “racial vetting” aspect of such policies has impor-
tant social impacts upon existing racial groups within nations. Recent work on “linked fate” 
in the American Latinx 1 community, for instance, shows that the prominent “anti-Hispanic” 
sentiment of US immigration policy since 2001 creates a greater sense of linked fate among 
Latinx Americans ( Vargas et al. 2017 ). We can think of “linked fate” as individual recogni-
tion of shared membership in, and so shared status, outcomes, and interests with, marginalised 
groups ( Dawson 1994 ). As prominent immigration policies focus on the exclusion and removal 
of Latinx immigrants, Latinx Americans see their own social status as linked to those who are 
excluded. This has a direct impact upon the social status and position of Latinx Americans who 
feel that arguments for the exclusion of the Latinx immigrants they identify with simultaneously 
denigrate them as an economic burden and place them at odds with America’s concept of itself. 
Such racial elements of immigration policy as these become clear, however, only once we start 
to analyse race more fully along its social, rather than biological, dimension. 
 The history of immigration policy in places such as Australia, then, makes for a relatively 
clear example of how treating race as biological rather than social can mask the role that policy 
has played in constructing racial hierarchies, and continues to play in maintaining those struc-
tures. It is not the only case we might have discussed here, and I would argue that when exam-
ined closely, much policy-making has been implicit in creating dominant racial structures, and 
by extension in maintaining structural racism. 
 We might have mentioned marriage policies, for example, by which the state has destabi-
lised and devalued minority family structures and imposed white family structures as normative 
( Pinderhughes 2002 ). When viewed this way, it is unsurprising that state intervention into 
black families in the US or Aboriginal families in Australia is disproportionately high, given that 
such family structures here are deemed unorthodox or are pathologised in virtue of not being 
white. Relatedly, we might have mentioned adoption policy debates which frequently bypass 
the role that adoption has played, and still plays, in state control of racial groups, the assimilation 
of minorities, and in some cases the intended eradication of races. The primary tools by which 
Australia, during its own racial formation, controlled its Aboriginal population was through 
forced adoption programs and what has come to be known as ‘the stolen generation’ ( Read 
1983 ). Similarly, in post-Ceausescu Romania of the 1990s, Roma children were taken from 
their families and placed into international adoption programs, which, alongside the forced 
sterilisation of Roma women, was used as a means of controlling the Gypsy Roma population 
( Kligman 1998 ). It is unsurprising, then, that while children from racial minority groups are 
often overrepresented in foster and adoptive care systems, families from racial minorities are 
reluctant to take on the role of adoptive parents and are usually underrepresented in the system. 
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This puts much debate on adoption policy (and not just the ethics or politics of interracial adop-
tion) in a different light. 
 We could continue by looking at, for instance, the racialised nature of education ( Woodson 
1933/1998 ) and the impact of education policy on people from minority groups ( Derrington 
2007 ). However, the general point here is that policy-making is itself part of the tool kit by 
which race is made, and through which oppressive racial hierarchies are maintained. It is part 
and parcel of what makes the practical racial experiences of the members of any given society. 
It is implicit in masking the infl uence of race for those at the top of any given racial hierarchy. 
Policy is one of the primary tools by which race is made ubiquitous, and it is one the chief 
mechanisms by which race is hidden from and for white people. This means that without 
proper attention to the social dimension of race and its connection to social policy, our philo-
sophical refl ection on policy-making is at best severely hampered, and at worst remains com-
plicit in maintaining racial privilege. 
 Conclusion 
 What I have tried to do in this chapter is, by showing my own starting points, motivate the 
claim that good policy-making (and philosophical engagement with it) must always pay atten-
tion to race. The argument is, I think, straightforward. The call to attend to practical concerns 
and social impacts in policy, the call to attend to the thick social construction of race, and the 
call to acknowledge that race is a prominent but unnoticed thread in our social fabric all seem 
to me to make the claim that race should always be a consideration for policy quite natural. 
The social dimension of race means policy is often an instrumental part of how race is made 
and maintained; the call to bottom-up theorising means we must look to the history and role 
that race plays when examining a policy’s practical impact; and the simultaneous ubiquity and 
hiddenness of race means we must be especially vigilant in looking for the traces of race and 
racism in our social policy regardless of whether they seem to be there upon fi rst inspection. 
I also take such a call to mean that the way that the philosophical examination of race and racial 
policy might proceed is different to more orthodox approaches. In particular, I think that much 
refl ection on policy would do well to pause and ask the type of question about race and policy 
that I posed here with the question “What is race?”. Engagement with race at the level of spe-
cifi c policy questions still seems to me to be viable, important, and pursuable in the right way, 
but engagement with race at this more general level for all policy refl ection is crucial. 
 Note 
 1  “Latinx” is used here as a gender-neutral alternative to the term “Latino”. 
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